As demonstrated throughout history, insurgencies are most likely to be successful when provided external help, especially when bordering nation states directly support the insurgency.
2
A recent RAND monograph on lessons from five decades of counterinsurgency research demonstrates this point:
Border security was the third element studied by RAND, as many insurgents rely on external support and cross-border sanctuaries. Sealing the borders could thus be very useful in COIN [Counterinsurgency] , as the French discovered in Algeria. The Morice Line sealed both the Tunisian and Moroccan borders to insurgents. RAND analysts, after initial skepticism about border security, began to advocate it in Vietnam, as infiltration from the north became a bigger component of the war, though the system was never implemented. 3 Several specific examples can demonstrate this point, as described in Record's article. Here, three examples where external support influenced the outcome of the insurgency will be discussed initially; two were successful and one was unsuccessful. These include the American Revolution, the American Civil War, and the Vietnam Conflict. 4 Our first conflict, the American Revolution, is an example of a successful externally supported insurgency. France, the American colony's principle ally, provided immense amounts of materiel for the colonists' war effort. This included 30,000 muskets, 300,000 pounds of gunpowder, and 25,000 uniforms, all of which were indispensable for fighting the 1777 campaigns. Additionally, Spanish and Dutch declarations of war against Great Britain preoccupied the British, opening the floodgates for massive French support to the colonists.
This included financing, 90 percent of the gunpowder consumed by American forces, and direct
French military intervention, all of which ultimately contributed to the defeat of the British.
Record also described the Confederate States of America's fight for secession from the Union during the American Civil War as an example of an unsuccessful insurgency due to the South's lack of external support. The Confederacy relied on Great Britain as its primary external supporter of the insurgency, depending heavily on British arms, ammunition, and materiel for the South's war effort. 5 Blockade-runners provided the Confederacy with 60 percent of its rifled shoulder arms, one third of its lead for bullets, the ingredients for three-quarters of its gunpowder supply, nearly all the paper required for cartridges, and critically needed food supplies. 6 Additionally, the North was industrially and materially stronger than the South, having 16 The However, the French anti-personnel mines, the electric fence, or the sheer firepower of the defending French patrols always defeated these attempts. Insurgents tried using diversionary tactics, using a small unit to set off an alarm at one site, and the main body attempting to break through some fifty kilometers away. At times, the insurgents would go all the way around the barrier into the barren Sahara Desert disguised as Maharists, but French aircraft or airdropped paratroops would interdict them. 19 The resounding success of the Morice Line in preventing the continued flow of personnel and materiel into Algeria could lead to the conclusion that border security by itself can defeat an insurgency. The question of whether border security alone can defeat a counterinsurgency will need further analysis.
Can Border Security Defeat an Insurgency by Itself?
The linkage between effective border security and the success of the French counterinsurgency in Algeria is clear, 20 but border security cannot defeat an insurgency by itself.
In fact, the overall counterinsurgency campaign should include several strategies in concert with border security as a major supporting element. To illustrate this point, four historical examples in Record's article will be discussed; these include the American Revolution, the American Civil War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the Algerian War. These examples demonstrate the need to employ several concurrent strategies to deal with stronger insurgent will and superior military strategy while sustaining national and political will for a potentially unpopular counterinsurgency war effort, despite having border security. 25 The Algerian Revolution especially demonstrates the importance of non-military elements of national power in a counterinsurgency campaign. However, there is no doubt that border security is an important component to an overall successful counterinsurgency. ultimate aim is to dissuade Iraqi national and political will by de-legitimizing the current United
States and Iraqi governments and demonstrating the futility in continuing their counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts. 26 Here, we will discuss several considerations in making the border secure and resilient. Where possible, the study of the Morice Line as a model barrier system will help define these considerations. 27 The seven considerations include applying depth, variation, redundancy, randomness, lethality, reliability, and adequate response to intrusion attempts. Each consideration is briefly addressed below.
Depth. The Morice Line displayed the use of depth by the placement of a 50-yard belt of anti-personnel mines on either side of an electrified fence. Collectively, depth is the physical width across the barrier, depth under the barrier, and the height of the barrier. Obviously, the wider, deeper, and higher the barrier, the more secure and impenetratable the barrier becomes.
Planners need to consider that outsiders will use any means to gain access as they tried against the Morice Line.
Variation. Another consideration of border security is varying the use of methods of border security. The Morice Line was a "system of systems" in which the integration of each individual system created a synergistic effect, allowing the collective system to exceed the contribution of each individual part. The Morice Line maintained its variation by the incorporation of detection alarms, pre-sighted artillery, and the use of frequent patrols as only a few of the many "sub-systems" collectively working together to secure the Algerian border.
Therefore, variation is the use of separate and distinct systems that form the collective barrier.
The greater the number of varying individual systems, the greater the synergy and effectiveness the barrier will display.
Redundancy. The Morice Line demonstrated its redundancy by the simultaneous use of anti-personnel mines, the electrified fence, and the additional barbed-wire entanglement obstacle. Redundancy is the use of separate, distinct, and independent systems that perform the same function. In the case of this example, the redundancy within the physical barrier served to dissuade and prevent entry.
Randomness. The fourth consideration for effective border security is the application of randomness throughout the barrier system to match random insurgent tactics. Randomness is the employment of systems along the barrier to operate at varying times and locations to avoid predictable patterns. An example of this within the Morice Line was the use of sporadic ground or helicopter patrols to spot infiltrators. Obviously, the more random the use of varying systems along the barrier, the harder it would be for outsiders to predict what system they would encounter.
Lethality. Next, one must consider lethality within the barrier for an effective barrier. The
Morice Line had several lethal systems, including anti-personnel mines, the electrified fence, and artillery systems to destroy forces seeking entry. Therefore, lethality is the ability of the barrier to cause certain death during any attempt to breach it. Lethality serves as a major deterrent to dissuade an intrusion attempt.
Reliability. The sixth consideration for effective border security is reliability. The ability to detect an attempted breach in the electric fence along with its location demonstrated the reliability of the Morice Line. Reliability is the barrier's ability to operate continuously without failure. Optimally, the barrier will need to be fully and constantly operative. The barrier would require an elaborate alarm system if either intrusion attempts or maintenance failures occurred.
Response to Intrusion Attempts. Lastly, response to intrusion attempts within the barrier must be considered. An example of this was France's ability to apply indirect fire quickly on insurgents attempting to breach the Morice Line or use parachute or heli-borne forces to interdict intruders. This consideration is the rapid application of military force to either interdict or defeat a force attempting to breach the barrier, or apply adequate response to deal with forces that successfully breached the obstacle. The faster the response time to attack the insurgent force, then the less likely the insurgents would successfully enter the defended area and evade capture within the local populace.
In summary, an effective barrier system must employ the seven aforementioned characteristics, namely depth, variation, redundancy, randomness, lethality, reliability, and adequate response to intrusion attempts. Only then will the barrier be effective in preventing continued external support of an insurgency. These considerations can specifically help protect Iraq's borders from support that clearly stems from outside influencers.
How External Support is Aiding the Iraqi Insurgency
There is no question that local nation state and non-state actors are externally supporting The vast majority of violence is occurring in four of Iraq's 18 provinces; they include the provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Salahuddin, and Diyala. 31 Iraq's borders, especially the western one in Al-Anbar province, have historically been porous. Smugglers and traders move routinely between Iraq and Syria, and so did insurgents. 33 In summary, it is clear that Iran and Syria are the two primary actors supporting the Iraqi insurgency. It should be no surprise that provinces adjacent to these nations are most problematic and probable points of entry for Iranian-and Syrian-backed insurgents. In order to develop a barrier system for Iraq, it is important to address the topography of Iraq's international boundaries.
Characteristics of the Iraqi Borders
The physical characteristics of the Iraqi borders make it difficult to secure completely. Iraq has a total border length of 3,650 kilometers. 34 Iraq shares a 1,458-kilometer border with Iran and a and a 352-kilometer border with Turkey to the north. 35 Iraq also has a 58-kilometer coastline along the Persian Gulf, 36 and fourteen land highway ports of entry. 37 The terrain is mostly flat and desolate desert along the borders in the west (with Jordan and Syria) and south (with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). 38 The terrain is generally green and mountainous along the northern border with Turkey and the eastern border with Iran. 39 The Iran-Iraq border runs along the western edge of the Zagros Mountains, with the southern portion becoming a broad marshy plain, and subject to inundation. 40 Boundary pillars demarcate the length of the entire Iran-Iraq border and number sequentially from south to north. 41 There seems to be no evidence that any physical barriers exist along any of Iraq's international boundaries.
The Coalition has recognized the border security problem and has begun focusing on the security of the Iraqi borders. The newly established Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement began training border enforcement officers that will eventually total a force of 37,000. 42 The
Iraqi government will also build 251 border forts employing night-vision capabilities; unattended ground sensors; and close circuit camera, television, and multiplex equipment. 43 It is unknown to the author whether Iraq is actually deploying an integrated and hardened physical barrier as is being advocated in this paper. Though the Iraqi government's efforts are a positive start, an approach to border security paralleling that of the United States with Mexico prior to 9/11 will most likely result in similar failure. One thing is certain as of the date of this paper. Despite the The barrier system for Iraq, like the Morice Line, should include the seven considerations previously discussed; depth, variation, redundancy, randomness, lethality, reliability, and response to intrusion attempts. Implementing these considerations can build upon the plans and work already completed to ensure these efforts were not in vain. However, before discussing how to implement an effective barrier system in Iraq, present border crossing sites in Iraq must also be addressed. Personnel assigned along the Syrian-Iraqi border have indicated that there have been problems with Iraqi border officials taking bribes and only superficially inspecting vehicles seeking to cross borders. 45 Despite the need for cross-border international trade and desire for family visitation, maintaining national security for Iraq should be a paramount national objective. The Iraqi government will need to develop policies to regulate border-crossing sites properly and efficiently, ensuring the denial of entry of insurgents and their materiel.
Implementing an Effective Barrier System in Iraq
It may be prudent to discuss the various systems that are available to build an effective barrier and strategies to employ them. These systems can include unmanned aerial vehicles To better defeat insurgent forces seeking entrance into Iraq, it is recommended that air assault units temporarily perform the border security mission currently performed by the Iraqi Theory and Practice, borders are a permanent source of weakness for a counterinsurgency, and are one of four primary factors for a successful insurgency. 48 "Until the borders are controlled,…the odds of actually defeating the insurgency are low." 49 To seal the Iraqi borders, the United States and the Iraqi governments should implement the following measures.
(1) The U.S. government should dedicate adequate funds to contract a request for proposal to develop the Iraqi barrier system to include further research of its feasibility. The proposed barrier system in Figure 2 may not be the best solution, so a "think tank" approach to developing a better solution may be appropriate. However, a border security strategy like that of the pre-9/11 U.S.-Mexican border is inadequate, and therefore requires a hardened border barrier and air assault troops to replace border agents for increased mobility and firepower. The study and proposal should consider how to integrate the current efforts being conducted to improve Iraqi border security so these efforts are not obviated. Once a proposal is developed and approved, it is recommend sealing the borders of the problematic Anbar and Diyala provinces first, and expand the fenced barrier to include the entire Syrian and Iranian borders if the insurgency continues to maintain its intensity.
(2) It is additionally recommend that the most troubled cities and city districts such as Fallujah and Sadr City be sealed off and secured as the Algerian Casbah sector was controlled during the Battle of Algiers. The sealing of Sadr City can serve as an initial test case for sealing other Iraqi cities as a viable counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq.
(3) To prevent insurgents from entering Iraq through border crossing sites, the Iraqi government should review its policies on how best to inspect and regulate all inbound transportation of commerce and foreign citizens at international border crossing sites. Further analysis on how to best implement effective border control at border-crossing sites is also needed to ensure insurgents and their materiel is denied entry.
Conclusion
In conclusion, though there is no guarantee that external assistance will ensure insurgent success, "the correlation between external assistance and insurgent victory…is striking." 50 Likewise, effective border security cannot necessarily win a counterinsurgency by itself, but a nation can definitely lose without it. Even with effective border security, there is no guarantee of a successful counterinsurgency without the application of other viable concurrent strategies. 
